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The bottom of the pyramid concept suggests that profit can be made in providing goods and 
services to poor people, when high volume is combined with low margins. To-date there has 
been very limited empirical evidence from the health sector concerning the scope and 
potential for such bottom of the pyramid models. This paper analyzes private for-profit (PFP) 
providers currently offering services to the poor on a large scale, and assesses the future 
prospects of bottom of the pyramid models in health. 
Methods 
We searched published and grey literature and databases to identify PFP companies that 
provided more than 40,000 outpatient visits per year, or who covered 15% or more of a 
particular type of service in their country. For each included provider, we searched for 
additional information on location, target market, business model and performance, including 
quality of care. 
Results 
Only 10 large scale PFP providers were identified. The majority of these were in South Asia 
and most provided specialized services such as eye care. The characteristics of the business 
models of these firms were found to be similar to non-profit providers studied by other 
analysts (such as Bhattacharya 2010). They pursued social rather than traditional marketing, 
partnerships with government, low cost/high volume services and cross-subsidization 
between different market segments. There was a lack of reliable data concerning these 
providers. 
Conclusions 
There is very limited evidence to support the notion that large scale bottom of the pyramid 
models in health offer good prospects for extending services to the poor in the future. In order 
to be successful PFP providers often require partnerships with government or support from 
social health insurance schemes. Nonetheless, more reliable and independent data on such 
schemes is needed. 
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Background 
The “Bottom of the Pyramid” (BoP) concept suggests that the poorest segments of the 
population are an untapped market for goods and services, and that multinational companies 
providing goods and service to this population can both be profitable and aid social 
development [1]. Typically such companies need to pursue a strategy that combines low 
profit margins (and prices) with high volume in order to be successful. BoP applications to 
the information and communication technology sector are the best documented, and such 
businesses have received most attention in India. 
However there has also been substantial criticism of the BoP idea. For example, critics have 
argued that Prahalad overestimated the number of people making less than $2 a day, and thus 
inflated the size of the market at the bottom of the pyramid [2]. Karamchandani et al [3] 
argued that few companies have been able to achieve the scale envisaged by the BoP 
argument. Landrum [4] questioned the transferability of the concept beyond India, where 
there are relatively large and concentrated, poor populations. Case studies of ICT kiosks in 
India that were targeted at the poor found that profit margins associated with serving this 
market were unattractive to private for-profit (PFP) firms, and thus de facto they served the 
middle class, and also were focused in urban rather than rural areas [5]. Pitta et al [6] 
concluded that “there is no agreement in the literature about the potential benefits of the BOP 
approach for both private companies and low-income consumers.” 
Prahalad [1] discusses the relevance of the BoP concept to the health sector, and certainly 
substantive evidence points to the role that the private sector already plays in caring for the 
poor. According to the IFC, “In Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and Uganda, more than 40% of the 
people in the lowest economic quintile receive health care from private, for-profit providers” 
[7] (pp8). In South Asia about three quarters of children from the lowest economic quintile 
with acute respiratory infections seek care in the private sector [8]. There are relatively few 
studies however that seek to assess the role that large private-for-profit companies currently 
play, and may play in the future, in providing services to the poor in low and middle income 
countries. Bhattacharyya et al [9] is one study that goes beyond simple description of a single 
initiative. The study reviewed and analyzed a number of innovative private sector service 
delivery models and identified key characteristics of these models. However this paper was 
not focused on the PFP sector and many of the initiatives mixed for-profit and non-profit 
modalities. Common characteristics of these innovative initiatives included (i) a focus on 
minimizing unit costs through reducing input prices and streamlining of medical processes, 
(ii) high patient volumes and (iii) cross-subsidization from wealthier patients to poorer 
patients. Bhattacharya concluded that there was little rigorous evidence of the quality of care 
provided or the extent to which services really reached the poor. 
Methods 
This study considers the extent to which for-profit, bottom of the pyramid models (BOP) are 
currently active at scale in LMICs with a view to assessing their potential in the future. 
Specifically we address the following questions: 
1. Are there large-scale, PFP companies that provide health services for the poor? 
2. Is there evidence of the impact of such PFP models on the quality and accessibility of care 
for the poor? 
3. What are the key characteristics of BOP business models in the health sector and in 
particular which characteristics have enabled them to reach a large scale? 
The analysis is limited to initiatives that deliver health services, excluding companies that 
focus on private health insurance, or commodities like drugs and family planning alone. Only 
initiatives that have reached a large scale were included, rather than small pilots that may 
never manage to scale up successfully. For this report “large scale” was defined as carrying 
out at least 40,000 outpatient consultations a year, or representing about 15% of a type of 
service in a their country. The threshold of 40,000 outpatient consultations a year was used 
because it represented a natural “break” in the data. As noted in Figure 1, of the 28 initiatives 
that qualified on all other criteria, 18 were eliminated because of the scale definition. The 
majority of these had no information on scale. If the scale threshold had been lowered to 
10,000 outpatient consultations annually, five additional initiatives would have qualified. If 
the threshold had been raised to 75,000 patients a year, only three companies would have 
been eligible. 
Figure 1 Search and selection process. 
Ethical review was not sought for this study as it was comprised solely of a desk based 
review of existing literature. 
We reviewed both published and grey literature, and adopted the following procedures: 
i. All PFP provider initiatives contained in the Center for Health Market Innovations 
(CHMI) database (http://healthmarketinnovations.org/), (which is the most comprehensive 
resource available on private sector initiatives in low and middle income countries) were 
identified. A search in January 2012, returned a total of 95 results for “Private sector (for-
profit)” and “Private Sector, non-specified” legal status. 
ii. Detailed review of program summaries in the CHMI database, led to the exclusion of 67 
initiatives because they were not for-profit, or were not related to health service delivery, 
or did not serve the poor, or the CHMI database indicated that the information was either 
incomplete or the initiative was no longer active. We did not seek to identify firms that 
self-identified as adopting a BoP model but rather included all companies that stated that 
part of their target client base included poor people. 
iii. For the remaining 28 initiatives, a Google, Google Scholar and PubMed search was 
conducted by company name in order to gather information on scale. An additional 18 
programs were excluded at this juncture either because there was very little information 
available on the initiative (including no company website) or because they were not 
considered large enough in scale, as defined previously. Information on scale was not 
available in a consistent format, and the numbers of patients seen per year are often 
estimates based on information found in the grey literature. In some cases, the number of 
beds in a given country was reported, and the annual number of patients served was 
triangulated by comparing it to similar organizations with similar bed capacity. 
iv. Existing reviews of private sector initiatives (including [7,10-13]) were hand searched to 
identify further initiatives. This yielded 26 initiatives that were not included in CHMI 
database. All of these were excluded either because they were not for-profit, or were not at 
scale, or did not have sufficient information available through a Google® and Google 
scholar® search. Figure 1 summarizes the search and selection process. Additional file 1 
contains a list of all the initiatives and the reason they were excluded. 
v. For each included company, a more in-depth search was conducted through the following : 
PubMed, Global Health, Embase, Scopus, Business of Healthcare, Business Source 
Complete, Google scholar and Lexis Nexis Academic. The type of information extracted 
for each initiative is summarized in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 Information Extracted regarding Included Initiatives. 
In reviewing the included initiatives we sought to identify and extract information concerning 
the technical or perceived quality of services provided, and information regarding how the 
initiative had affected the accessibility of care (either geographical or financial). With regard 
to key characteristics of BoP business models, we had no prior framework concerning which 
types of characteristics might be key, instead all available information on the business model 
was extracted, and we sought to compare across the different firms included to identify 
commonalities and differences in their approach. 
Results and discussion 
Overview of initiatives 
Table 1 summarizes characteristics of the included organizations. Very few initiatives met all 
of the inclusion criteria. Seven of the ten initiatives identified are chains of clinics or 
hospitals, where a single company owns and operates multiple hospitals or clinics, based in 
different geographical areas. All of the hospital chains are based in India, except for the two 
eye care specialty chains – Visualiza in Guatemala and the Lumbini Institute in Nepal. The 
chains range in size: LifeSpring clinics have about 20 beds each, whereas Narayana 
Hrudayalaya’s (NH) flagship hospital has 1000 beds. Of the remaining initiatives: CEGIN is 
a network of private providers which agree to accept CEGIN members at reduced prices; 
Queen Mamohato Memorial Hospital in Botšabelo, Lesotho is a public hospital with 
associated filter clinics that is operated by a private consortium; and Ziqitza is a PFP 
emergency response service based in India. Ziqitza provides some basic clinical services 
inside of the ambulances, but clearly not to the same extent as the other clinics and hospitals. 
Lastly, all but two of the initiatives (Visualiza and CEGIN) operate principally in urban areas. 
Table 1 Overview of companies included in the study 
Program name Type of initiative Country Year 
Establish-ed 
Health Focus Clients served/number of beds Number of facilities operated 
CARE Hospitals Chain of hospitals or 
clinics 
India 1997 Cardiology & other specialty services. 
Primary health care in urban and rural 
areas 
450,000 outpatients, 30,000 admissions, 
4,000 cardiac surgeries 
12 hospitals and a number of clinics 
with a total of 1600 beds 
Centro Ginecologico 
Integral (CEGIN) 




Chain of hospitals or 
clinics 
India 2005 Maternal and Child Health About 50,000 outpatient and inpatient 
consultations per year 
9 hospitals with 20 beds each 
Lumbini Eye Institute Chain of hospitals or 
clinics 
Nepal 1983 Eye care Provides 25% of eye care in Nepal, treating 
about 260,000 patients per year and 
performing 30,000 surgeries per year 
1 main hospital with 215 beds, 3 




Chain of hospitals or 
clinics 
India 2001 Chronic diseases (heart surgeries, 
cancer, orthopaedics, kidney disease) 
6,000 operations per year which represents 
about 12% of heart surgeries in India. No 
estimates of patient numbers were found, but 
NH has about 3× capacity of CARE 
hospitals 
Currently has 5000 beds in India 
Queen Mamohato 
Memorial Hospital 
Stand alone clinic or 
hospital 
Lesotho 2002/03 General primary, secondary and 
tertiary care 
About 187,000 patients per year 1 referral hospital and 3 filter clinics 
Vaatsalya Hospitals Chain of hospitals or 
clinics 
India 2004 Primary and secondary care 400,000 patients 14 hospitals 
Visualiza Chain of hospitals or 
clinics 
Guatemala 1997 Eye care Screens over 30,000 patients per year and 
performs 30% of cataract surgeries in 
Guatemala 
 
Viva Sehat (formerly Razi 
clinics) 
Chain of hospitals or 
clinics 
India 2009 General primary care About 230,00 patients per year 65 clinics in Hyderabad 
Ziqitza Ambulance services India 2005 Eye services About 50,000 patients per year 90 ambulances 
It was frequently difficult to define the legal status of the company, and in particular to 
understand its for-profit status. For example, when CEGIN was a purely for-profit enterprise, 
it appeared to only reach about 9000 people. In 2004 it established a membership card 
program (known as the SER program) that provides discounted access to CEGIN services. 
This enabled CEGIN to expand its coverage by about 5 times [14], and is the reason that it 
reached the scale to be included in the study. But all of the proceeds from the membership 
cards go to a tax-exempt foundation, called the SER Foundation. 
NH and CARE were the only two companies that extended care to poorer patients in rural 
areas, and they did this through their charitable arms and often with the use of technology. 
For example, each of NH’s rural coronary care units is linked to an NH center via video-
conferencing and software that enables rural staff to transmit ECG images for consultation 
with an NH specialist. This service is supported by the Asia Heart Foundation and is free to 
clients [15]. CARE Foundation actually pre-dates the for-profit hospital chain. Similarly to 
NH, part of its mandate has been to expand telemedicine, including installing image sharing 
software, so that rural patients are able to benefit from specialists who are based in urban 
areas. Additionally, CARE Foundation has forged a partnership with the government of India 
and other private foundations to pay for about 500 pediatric heart surgeries a year [16]. 
Partnerships or agreements with government were often critical to the success of the 
company. Companies that practiced cross-subsidization at a large scale attracted patients with 
state subsidized insurance (RSBY in India and the majority of CEGIN’s clients have state 
health insurance), which provides them with a base of poor clients who can still pay. NH, has 
gone a step further and forged an insurance product, called Yeshasvini, in partnership with 
the state of Karnataka. Yeshasvini provides coverage to farmers that have belonged to a 
cooperative for at least one year, with the state government paying the bulk of the premium 
[15]. CARE has stated that it hopes to also introduce its own micro-insurance product that 
will complement RSBY. 
Queen Mamohato Memorial Hospital is another example of public-private partnership. To 
raise capital for a 400+ bed hospital and three filter clinics (requiring approximately $120 
million), a Private-Public Investment Partnership (PPIP) was established between the 
Government of Lesotho and private groups. Under the PPIP, the Government of Lesotho 
contributed roughly 36 percent of total costs, and the remaining 64 percent came from private 
sources, primarily the Development Bank of Southern Africa and the Tšepong consortium. 
Netcare, one of South Africa’s largest private hospital groups, is the largest stakeholder 
(40%) of the Tšepong consortium, which is made up of a group of local and international 
healthcare providers. Under an 18-year agreement, Netcare will also provide all clinical and 
non-clinical services in the health care facilities. Netcare will generate returns on 35 private 
hospital beds that can serve patients with private insurance as well as by using government 
infrastructure, like radiology theaters. The rest of the hospital beds, however, will be general 
ward and open to the public, which is largely low-income in this underserved area [17]. 
Characteristics: delivering value to clients 
We did not find any evaluations of perceived quality of care in the included initiatives and 
only one study of technical quality, that examined surgical outcomes of cataract surgeries 
performed in the Lumbini and Bheri zones in Nepal [18]. While the study’s findings are not 
only attributed to work performed by the Lumbini Eye Institute, its findings that both clinical 
and visual functioning or quality of life outcomes were below expected levels demonstrates 
the importance of evaluating outcomes. For heart surgeries, NH has reported an overall 
hospital mortality rate of 2% and a hospital-acquired infection rate of 2.8 per 1000 ICU days, 
but it seems that this data has not been published in a peer reviewed journal [19]. Other 
sources have cited that CARE has comparable outcomes for heart surgeries without reporting 
specific figures [20]. Overall, information on health outcomes is not systematically available. 
The majority of the companies are based in urban or peri-urban settings, which means that 
they are in densely populated areas with many potential customers. Many of the hospital 
chains are located in smaller cities. From the start, Vaatsalya focused on small and medium 
towns that lacked secondary health care services, its strategy was to create small hospitals 
that could fill this gap and reduce travel-related health expenses [21]. Similarly, LifeSpring 
was founded to serve low to middle income clients in peri-urban areas that were not satisfied 
with public hospitals and could not afford the existing expensive private hospitals [22]. 
CARE hospitals, which are larger than Vaatsalya and LifeSpring facilities, also chose to 
locate in lower income peripheral urban areas, in order to be closer to their target population, 
and not compete with private hospital groups like Fortis or Apollo that are located in 
metropolitan centers and target high income individuals [20]. 
Few of the companies emphasized traditional marketing techniques but instead carried out 
community outreach. This approach may be particularly suited to low income populations 
because its educational component explains why and when it is necessary to seek care at a 
health facility [6]. CARE trains Village Health Champions to provide health information and 
algorithm-based guidance on whether or not medical care should be sought. The Champions 
refer people to CARE facilities if needed [16]. Ziqitza conducted outreach efforts to hospitals 
and policemen to encourage them to refer patients to their service, as well as use it 
themselves to transport patients [23]. LifeSpring outreach workers hold monthly health 
camps in the hospital catchment area to raise publicity and explain why women should 
deliver in a hospital [22]. 
For poor clients, personal contact and an ensuing dialog is more likely to capture and keep 
customers [24]. In order to persuade poorer and more conservative consumers, it is also 
important to target groups or social networks, since they “lower risk by shopping together 
and comparing notes,” as well as offer samples or product demonstrations [24]. LifeSpring 
uses both of these strategies. Firstly, if it identifies pregnant women during its monthly 
outreach camps, its outreach workers give her a voucher for some services at the center to 
encourage her to visit a LifeSpring facility and try it. Additionally, LifeSpring offers 
(unspecified) loyalty rewards to existing patients for each word-of-mouth referral, and 90% 
of its customer base has been referred by a personal contact [22]. 
All of the initiatives state that their superior customer orientation, as compared to government 
hospitals, is the main reason that they are able to attract patients. Examples of being sensitive 
to the needs of target populations include locating facilities closer to lower income 
populations, having longer opening hours to accommodate people’s working schedules, and 
appointments rather than waiting lines. Many of the initiatives also emphasized creating a 
culture of respect for the patient. For example, LifeSpring has a customer CARES protocol 
(Courteous, Attentive, Respectful, Enthusiastic and Safe), which all staff members are 
expected to follow [22]. Vaatsalya routinely carries out customer satisfaction surveys to 
ensure that its patients feel “cared” for by its medical staff [25]. 
Careful attention to the preferences and purchasing habits of target populations has led to 
innovations in the pricing of services and payment modalities. Private facilities fulfill 
patients’ aspirational preferences by offering basic but clean facilities and options for more 
privacy. The hospitals and clinics generally offer three types of rooms with tiered pricing: 
private, semi-private and general ward. To alleviate the anxiety associated with paying for 
health care, Vaatsalya emphasizes having very clear and transparent billing to enable its 
clients to verify all charges [25]. LifeSpring prominently advertises its bundled services for 
Caesareans and vaginal deliveries that have an all-inclusive price [22]. Low-income 
customers tend to buy goods or services in smaller quantities and more frequently because 
their incomes vary more. To accommodate this CEGIN uses micro-credit to break down the 
cost of more expensive procedures into manageable payments. Members can access a loan 
from CEGIN’s micro-credit fund if they require a more expensive procedure [14]. 
Capturing value: profits 
Since the initiatives are pro-poor, most of them use specialization and standardization to 
reduce costs and achieve high patient volumes. Only Viva Sehat, which has 65 clinics 
throughout Hyderabad, provides broad primary care, but there is very little information 
currently available on it. Specialized services are more amenable to a smaller number of 
standardized diagnosis and treatment protocols. The use of protocols is assumed to lead to 
good outcomes and the avoidance of unnecessary and costly complications and medical 
procedures. For example, LifeSpring hospitals immediately refer all complicated cases to 
larger hospitals. Only taking on simpler cases for which there are protocols in place, allows 
LifeSpring to employ clinical staff with less experience and lower wage expectations [3]. 
According to its program description in the CHMI database, Viva Sehat provides doctor 
consultation and diagnostic services according to software-based standardized treatment 
protocols. They also maintain electronic patient profiles in order to minimize errors and 
enable quality follow-up of patients. 
Some groups reach high volumes by focusing on relatively simple and low cost services. 
CEGIN, in Argentina, focuses on delivering gynecology services to low-income women, 
especially cervical cancer screening. Private doctors agree to participate in this network and 
offer services at reduced prices, because they gain a higher volume of patients [26]. Aravind, 
which was not included in this analysis because it is now a charitable trust rather than a for-
profit model, pioneered the specialty care system at high volumes in low-income settings. Its 
method, which has been documented extensively elsewhere, achieves its volumes by 
conducting surgeries in a production line [27]. 
Part of the reason that this model works for Aravind and similar groups like Lumbini and 
Visualiza, is that cataract surgery is a short intervention that does not require substantial 
follow-up or rehabilitation. Other groups like NH and CARE, which both focus on chronic 
diseases and began by emphasizing cardiac care, show that the same approach can be adapted 
to heart surgery. According to the Wall Street Journal, Dr. Shetty of NH has called his 
strategy “the Wal-martization of healthcare,” and his facilities perform approximately 19 
open heart surgeries and 25 catheterization procedures a day, which is about eight times 
higher than the average Indian hospital. 
The most common characteristic of initiatives is that they focus on minimizing costs. Many 
of the initiatives avoid costly infrastructure investments. For example, CEGIN does not 
require its own infrastructure since it is a network of providers. All of the hospital chains 
based in India, except for NH, lease rather than own the land or buildings they operate in. 
Their locations in peri-urban areas or in Tier 2 and 3 towns mean that real estate is less 
expensive. NH differs in that it is located in Bangalore and has built its own facilities, but this 
was done with a subsidy from within the family [15]. 
Most of the companies also aggressively reduce costs for fixed assets and supplies. Some of 
the larger initiatives leverage their size to negotiate favorable agreements with manufacturers. 
For example, in addition to using generic drugs, NH negotiates short-term contracts with 
manufacturers to routinely get supplies at 30-35% lower cost [15]. NH and other groups also 
maximize the use of fixed assets in order to lower unit costs. For example CARE hospitals 
use their radiology equipment throughout the day for outpatient appointments, and at night 
for inpatients [16]. 
The smaller hospital chains avoid investing in expensive equipment or capacities by 
simplifying what they offer. LifeSpring Hospitals, which focuses on maternal and child 
health, mainly offers outpatient services through its network of small hospitals (25-30 beds), 
with deliveries as its only inpatient service. The hospitals do not have food services or their 
own emergency transport fleet, but depend on other state and non-governmental services 
[28]. LifeSpring and Vaatsalya Hospitals also do not have their own blood banks or 
laboratory facilities. Instead, their facilities are strategically located near larger facilities, 
including medical schools, that do have these capacities, and they either refer patients to these 
services or establish agreements to use these resources rather than invest in their own [22,25]. 
Lastly, the companies exhibit innovative strategies to reduce human resources costs. 
LifeSpring and CEGIN tend to hire recent clinical graduates who are less experienced and are 
willing to work in small private hospitals to gain experience. CARE has its own training 
program to enable task-shifting, where physician assistants take on the work of residents. 
This provides physicians more time for research, which helps keep them satisfied and retains 
them [20]. At NH, doctors are paid fixed salaries that are comparable to other private 
hospitals, but they are expected to work longer hours and perform more procedures. This 
approach allows NH to spend 22% of its revenues on salaries compared to 60%, which is 
commonly found in the West [15]. 
Many of the companies studied reach the poor through cross-subsidization that is using 
higher mark-ups on wealthier patients to partly subsidize care for poorer patients. CARE 
states that 70% of its patients are subsidized to varying degrees or do not pay; NH up to 60%; 
Ziqitza, 20%; and Lumbini, 12%. This information was not available for Visualiza, CEGIN 
or LifeSpring. NH prints daily profit and loss statements in order to know in real time the 
balance that they need to strike. Free procedures will be postponed in order to ensure that the 
company maintains a healthy bottom line [21]. 
Some of the companies, do not use cross-subsidies, but instead, because of their locations 
they end up serving low income populations. For example, Queen Mamohato Memorial 
Hospital has 395 general ward beds and 35 private ones, but the private rooms are used to 
generate profits for Netcare rather than to extend care. Vaatsalya recognizes that its prices are 
still out of reach for the poorest quintile, but it would not able to expand or survive if it were 
to reduce its prices further. Similarly, Viva Sehat does not offer tiered pricing, though there is 
not documentation describing why. 
Conclusions 
This analysis showed that most for-profit companies reaching our measure of scale are based 
in urban and peri-urban areas in South Asia, and that there are very few of them. Since most 
companies follow the BoP model of low-cost, high-volume services, it makes sense that the 
companies are based in areas with high population density. Further the mix of incomes means 
that they can cross-subsidize between patients. Even so, many of the for-profit companies we 
examined used charitable arms or partnerships with the government to expand their services 
to the poor. 
Bhattacharaya et al [9] found many similar practices to those in our study, including social 
rather than traditional marketing, partnerships with government, low cost/high volume 
services and cross-subsidization. However eight of ten of the innovative organizations studied 
by Bhattacharaya were non-profit. By focusing solely on for-profit companies our review 
sheds light on some of the practices that contribute to their survival and growth – and they are 
surprisingly similar to those pursued by non-profits. None of the companies included here 
used traditional marketing techniques, instead using community outreach and education. All 
focused on improving their customer orientation in a number of ways, including decreasing 
opportunity costs of seeking care through more convenient locations and suitable opening 
hours; treating clients respectfully; and bundling services with transparent prices. Medically, 
the companies minimized their costs: some leveraged their size to reduce input costs while 
others simplified the services they offered, and most had strategies to make human resources 
more affordable. All of the companies standardized their medical processes as much as 
possible. 
This study’s most challenging limitation was the availability of documentation. It was often 
difficult to find accurate indicators of scale which may have affected the initiatives’ 
inclusion. Further, our cut-off point regarding scale, (ie. excluding companies serving fewer 
than 40,000 clients per year), though indicated by a natural break in the data, was arbitrary, 
and it is possible that including somewhat smaller firms may have enriched the evidence. 
Data on prices and profit margins were also not available. As a desk review, the analysis 
depended on a limited number of case studies that have been written by various business 
schools and organizations over the last ten years, as well other grey literature. Therefore the 
findings of this landscape analysis may be biased towards companies that had more 
documentation. Information was frequently incomplete, or had not been subject to fact 
checking or peer review. There is also a bias towards English language resources, which may 
underrepresent companies working in Latin America, Francophone Africa and Asia. 
Two main policy implications emerge. First, there is still a dearth of empirical evidence on 
the relevance of the Base of the Pyramid concept in the health sector. In particular, evidence 
regarding quality of care is needed, but also the extent to which large for-profit companies 
actually reach the poor rather than the middle class. The majority of companies included 
offered specialized care. Broad primary care services may typically have lower margins and 
would require a longer time to profitability. Viva Sehat clinics were the exception, but there 
was very limited information on the company to shed light on what made it successful. 
Second, the Prahalad vision of multinational companies serving the poor does not appear to 
have materialized in the health sector. Instead, a host of home-grown private companies are 
serving the BoP through partnerships with foundations and government, and non-profit 
organizations are probably more active than for-profit firms in serving the poor. Risk-sharing 
schemes, appear to be a more promising way governments and donors can engage with for-
profit health care companies to reach the poor on a larger scale. This may especially be the 
case in areas where there is a lower population density and smaller middle class that can help 
support for-profit hospital or clinic chains. 
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